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PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: SEIU’S FAILED
BID IN PUERTO RICO wusa_231 235..248
César F. Rosado Marzán
In October of 2008, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) failed to obtain majority support
to represent a 40,000-member bargaining unit of public school teachers in Puerto Rico even though it had
most of the odds stacked in its favor: a huge war chest, a decertified and bankrupt rival, and the Puerto Rican
government qua employer’s neutrality, if not outright support. The Federación de Maestros de Puerto Rico,
the SEIU’s rival, campaigned against the SEIU’s bid for exclusive representation by focusing on rank-and-
file mobilization and a message against raiding by a “colonial” union. The event showed that even
progressive and successful unions such as the SEIU are not immune to oligarchic tendencies and may raid
other unions in pursuit of money and power. Strategies that combine more democratic, bottom-up mobili-
zation, including, in the case of Puerto Rico, strengthening the long-established tradition of minority
unionism, could dampen future oligarchic tendencies, buttress industrial democracy, and create better
coexistence between trade union organizations. To move forward, especially given the global crisis that has
befallen us, unions need to start acting in the most principled of ways and expressing solidarity in the deepest
manners.
The year 2008 was among the grimmest of years for workers worldwide and
2009 will be worse. Neither was 2008 a stellar year for the Service Employees
International Union (SEIU), a union otherwise recognized for its organizational
and political successes. While the U.S. was deep in the presidential campaign
debating the causes and possible solutions to the global economic crisis, we
learned that the SEIU was embroiled in fights against one of its largest locals,
United Healthcare Workers West (UHW). The schism was related to whether
or not the SEIU could divide UHW into two locals, one representing the
nursing home/home health aid workers and another one for the rest. A less
commented upon but equally important story was the SEIU’s fight in the U.S.
“Commonwealth” qua colony of Puerto Rico against the Federación de Maestros
de Puerto Rico (FMPR), the main teachers’ union of that Caribbean island. There,
the interunion spat was related to a union election campaign where SEIU
supported a new affiliate to its structure, the Asociación de Maestros—Sindicato
Puertorriqueño de Maestros (AMPR–SPM), or the Association of Teachers—
Puerto Rican Teachers Union, against the FMPR. Even though in January of
2009 SEIU’s international union was successful in splitting UHW and placing it
under trusteeship, in October of 2008 SEIU suffered a dramatic setback when it
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lost the union elections to represent 40,000 Puerto Rican teachers. This loss
occurred in spite of the fact that the SEIU local ran unopposed in the official
ballot, had an enormous war chest, had scores of imported foot soldiers from the
U.S. to campaign for the union, and even had the blessing of the employer, the
Puerto Rican government.1
The FMPR, sectors of the Puerto Rican left, and others sympathetic to
Puerto Rico’s struggle for national self-determination saw the SEIU’s loss as a
victory against union “imperialism” and “colonialism.” Some advocates of the
labor colonialism or imperialism concept argue that the SEIU, and any other
U.S.-based international union, has an explicit or hidden agenda to keep Puerto
Rico subjugated to U.S. colonialism and its imperialist project.2 However, this
hard-line, anti-imperialist perspective is not backed by evidence and fails to
appreciate the reasons underlying the SEIU’s interest in Puerto Rico. Here I
argue that SEIU’s bid to represent Puerto Rican teachers was motivated by
old-fashioned “oligarchic” concerns (cf. Michels 1962), including deriving a new
source of union dues and consolidating political power in Puerto Rico. The
effects of such oligarchic expansion could be termed “colonial” as they include the
Americanization of Puerto Rican labor institutions by further extending U.S.-
based international union structures and cementing exclusive representation
privileges to labor unions, an institutional arrangement which, although exists in
different forms in foreign jurisdictions, is predominantly American (Summers
1998). Finally, the article concludes by arguing that the SEIU’s failed bid to
represent the teachers, as other interunion conflicts, calls for U.S. unions to
adopt more bottom-up practices firmly based on workers’ lived experiences, and
in this fashion, create organizations that are more relevant to the needs of
workers, serve as an instrument to unite the working class, and curb the offi-
cialdom’s tendencies to engage in destructive power plays. Adopting more
bottom-up strategies does not mean that unions should abandon all top-down
strategies and activities. It just calls for a more balanced approach. In the case
of Puerto Rico, this can mean that unions should try to pause their incessant
pursuit of exclusive representation and consider reinforcing the long-standing
practice of minority unionism to expand industrial democracy and working class
organization while at the same time diminish incentives for union raiding.
Unions in Puerto Rico, 1898–Present
U.S. union presence in Puerto Rico can be traced almost to the day in which
victorious U.S. troops fighting in the Hispanic-American War marched into the
southern Puerto Rican port of Guánica in 1898. At first, American union pres-
ence in Puerto Rico was indirect. Santiago Iglesias Pantín, Puerto Rico’s most
prominent labor leader in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century,
sought economic aid from Samuel Gompers’ American Federation of Labor
(AFL) to organize Puerto Rican workers, aid which Gompers provided to
promote better wages and working conditions in Puerto Rico and limit Puerto
Rican migration to the U.S. (Galvin 1979, 56; García and Quintero Rivera 1984,
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37–9). Notwithstanding Gompers’ aid and Puerto Rican unions’ formal associa-
tion with the AFL, Puerto Rico developed an autochthonous labor movement
with little resemblance to its U.S., “business unionism” counterpart. By 1915,
Santiago Iglesias’ federation, the Federación Libre de Trabajadores (FLT), had
led militant strikes in Puerto Rico’s cane fields, where most Puerto Rican
workers labored. The FLT also created the Socialist Party in 1915, with the
feared “torch” as its symbol. The torch, usually recognized as a symbol of truth
and liberty, had a different meaning in Puerto Rico, because it was the main tool
used by worker activists to char sugarcane when their bosses refused to bargain
with the workers. The Socialist Party also ran candidates, some of which won the
mayoral office of many cities and towns of Puerto Rico (García and Quintero
Rivera 1984, chapter 5).
In the early 1930s, the FLT and the Socialist Party took a more conservative
line and allied themselves with the conservative Partido Republicano, or Repub-
lican Party, the party of the landowners and sugar barons.3 As a result, Socialist
and FLT left-wing cadres and some members of the Nationalist Party, a radical
anti-imperialist and pro-independence political formation, founded a Commu-
nist current that was later responsible for both the establishment of the pro-
Soviet, Communist Party of Puerto Rico and the creation of the Confederación
General de Trabajadores (CGT), a labor union federation organized under the
lines of “industrial unionism” of the American Congress of Industrial Organi-
zations. The FLT and the Socialist Party continued to operate, but were in rapid
decline, both in terms of membership and overall influence in Puerto Rican
society and politics. Around the same time, the Partido Popular Democrático, or
the PPD, was also organized by Luis Muñoz Marín and others. Initially, the
PPD had a populist program for “bread, land and liberty” and for Puerto Rican
political independence. The CGT supported the fledgling populares. However,
by the 1940s, the PPD attenuated its program, advocating for mere local
autonomy for Puerto Rico other than full-blown independence and for an
export-based development program more in line with U.S. interests.4 It also
made a call to the labor movement and other civil society groups to join the
party. The CGT split into a popular faction that became an active part of the
PPD. A more independent and militant faction of the CGT split from the labor
organization as the PPD became more powerful and more conservative. Even-
tually, the non-PPD faction was repressed by the government and McCarthyism
(Ayala and Bernabe 2007, chapter 7; García and Quintero Rivera 1984, 135–6).
By mid-century, the PPD had become a hegemonic party in Puerto Rico,
winning consecutive elections with much more than 50 percent of the vote from
1944 until 1968. Puerto Rico also became a preferred site for runaway industry,
given the island’s free trade relationship with the U.S., federal tax exemptions,
and low wages.
When the AFL–CIO was created in 1954, the federation was at first uncom-
fortable with Puerto Rico’s “tax haven” status, which was bleeding many U.S.
union shops in the mainland. However, the AFL–CIO eventually came to
support the Commonwealth status for Puerto Rico and its economic model as
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long as the government of Puerto Rico did not oppose its unions’ organizing
drives in the island (Galvin 1979, 157–61; Rosado Marzán 2005). In this manner,
the AFL–CIO became a partner of the PPD, just as the moderate wing of the
CGT became in the previous decade.
It was not until the late 1960s when the PPD lost its first elections against
the pro-statehood5 Partido Nuevo Progresista, or the New Progressive Party,
and when a new crop of young, radicalized labor leaders came to the fore,
that independent labor organizations began to take renewed importance in
Puerto Rico (García and Quintero Rivera 1984, 140–2). Because most public
sector employees did not have collective bargaining rights under Puerto
Rican law, many of these independent labor organizations were “bona fide
associations,” or minority unions with no formal collective bargaining rights.
Nevertheless, thousands of public sector workers, including teachers, joined
them and undertook militant strategies to pressure for concessions from the
government-employer.
As more fully detailed in a former article (Rosado Marzán 2007), U.S.-based
unions made a comeback in Puerto Rico in the late 1990s when the government
of Puerto Rico granted public sector labor unions majority representation rights.
A 1998 public sector labor law provided a new opportunity to U.S.-based unions
to return to Puerto Rico, as it gave them a more familiar, if not profitable,
institutional framework to represent workers—exclusive representation.
The FMPR
Some bona fide associations did not disband with the new 1998 public
sector labor law. Fearing that they would be displaced by other labor organi-
zations, some bona fide associations such as the FMPR decided to reorganize
themselves as workers’ exclusive representatives under the new law. At that
time, the FMPR was affiliated with the American Federation of Teachers
(AFT), its parent international union since the 1960s. The international union
provided monetary and human resources to help the local union campaign and
win union elections in 1998. At that time, the FMPR won the union elections
against the AMPR. Once it became the exclusive representative of all public
school teachers, the FMPR catapulted to new heights of importance in Puerto
Rican industrial relations.
In 2004, the FMPR disaffiliated with the AFT as a result of several events.
First, in 2003, a left-wing caucus of the union, Compromiso, Democracia y Mili-
tancia (CODEMI)—Commitment, Democracy and Militancy—defeated the
incumbent leadership in labor union elections after the incumbent leadership
was involved in a number of scandals, including the bankruptcy of the union’s
health insurance fund. The CODEMI argued for disaffiliation with the AFT not
only because of the prior leadership’s mishandling of the union, but also because
the international union was increasing its per capita union dues to the FMPR
while teachers’ salaries remained stagnant at about $20,000. The CODEMI also
argued that while the teachers suffered economic deprivation and low wages,
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Washington-based officers of the international union made six-figure salaries.
Finally, the CODEMI also wanted a divorce from the AFT to pursue a different
strategy in its actions against the employer based not on lobbying government
leaders, as the AFT preferred, but on mobilizing the rank and file. After putting
the issue before an assembly of delegates and, thereafter, to the entire member-
ship in a referendum, the vote for disaffiliation triumphed overwhelmingly, and
the FMPR disaffiliated from the AFT. The AFT tried to challenge the disaffili-
ation in the courts and by placing the FMPR into trusteeship, but both tactics
failed.
SEIU versus FMPR
Struggles between the AMPR, the parent union of the SPM, and the
FMPR have deep roots that surpass any SEIU influence or involvement in
Puerto Rico. In 1913, more than fifty years before the FMPR was formed,
teachers and other educators in Puerto Rico created the AMPR as a profes-
sional and mutual aid society (Ayala and Bernabe 2007, 78). Although it has
not always represented teachers’ interests as employees for it has had a thick
layer of management personnel as members and leaders, it did promote
important initiatives, such as the elimination of mandatory, English-only lan-
guage instruction for all public school students in Puerto Rico. Mandatory,
English-only language instruction was clearly a colonial policy of the former
U.S.-appointed governors of the island with no other aim but to strip Puerto
Ricans of their Hispanic culture (See Ayala and Bernabe 2007, 75–8). The
policy failed for many reasons, including the fact that teachers, being Puerto
Ricans themselves and having no English language skills, did not, and could
not, implement it.
In the 1940s, the AMPR joined the PPD’s populist political project and
functioned as the teachers’ wing of the party in an almost corporatist framework.
The AMPR became a highly prominent organization, but some teachers sus-
tained that the AMPR provided no independent voice for teachers as a result of
its affiliation with the PPD. In the 1960s, these disaffected teachers formed the
FMPR as a rival institution.
In recent years, the AMPR created the SPM to challenge the FMPR in
union elections. The AMPR created the SPM to challenge the teachers because
the AMPR’s leadership and membership includes public school directors and
other supervisory personnel which, under Puerto Rican law, as most labor laws
in U.S. jurisdictions, cannot be members of a union’s bargaining unit. Moreover,
knowing that the FMPR would be a difficult rival to beat, AMPR–SPM also
affiliated with the SEIU in 2008 to buttress its resources for the upcoming union
elections.
By the time the AMPR–SPM affiliated with the SEIU, the U.S.-based
international union had two locals in Puerto Rico which, together, had
about 30,000 members out of a total of about 140,000 members of labor
organizations in Puerto Rico. If the SEIU would have won the elections, it
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would have represented about 70,000 workers in Puerto Rico, or about half
of all members of labor organizations in the island, making the SEIU the
numerically most important labor institution in Puerto Rico. While a
victory in those union elections would have been a major turning point
for AMPR, which for more than ten years had been trying to unseat the
FMPR as the exclusive representative of the teachers, it would have been
nothing short of a political bonanza for the SEIU, which could then speak
on behalf of almost a majority of all labor organization members in Puerto
Rico.
FMPR’s Illegal Strike and Decertification
While the AMPR–SPM, now affiliated with the SEIU, prepared to chal-
lenge the FMPR in union elections, the FMPR was negotiating a new collective
bargaining agreement with the management, the Puerto Rico Department of
Education (DOE). The teachers had been without a contract for three years,
and in late 2007, the FMPR’s members’ plenary assembly, attended by tens of
thousands of members, voted in favor of a resolution to implement a strike at
any time the leadership of the union found it proper. The members’ assembly
provided such authority to the leadership even though the 1998 public sector
labor law, which governed the affairs of the FMPR, made strikes illegal. The
union would face decertification if it engaged in a strike.
Without the FMPR yet calling for a strike, the Puerto Rico DOE filed an
unfair labor practice charge against the union for voting in favor of a strike.
The Puerto Rico Public Service Commission (Commission), the agency that
administers the 1998 public sector law and adjudicates such charges, decided
the charge in favor of the DOE, issued a complaint against the FMPR, and
decertified the largest union in Puerto Rico. At that point, the DOE
announced it would no longer bargain with the FMPR because the union had
been decertified.
Already into the New Year, the FMPR challenged the decertification order
in the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals. Based on policy grounds to protect the
public interest, the Court made an interim decision in favor of the union and
called on the parties to sit at the negotiating table and reach an agreement. The
parties started to bargain again, and the DOE made a number of important
concessions, but not enough to satisfy the FMPR’s leadership.
In February of 2008, the FMPR leadership implemented the strike.6 With
the strike now a reality, the DOE filed another unfair labor practice charge at
the Commission. The FMPR was, again, decertified, but this time, having
clearly violated the law, remained decertified and could no longer officially
represent Puerto Rican teachers. Moreover, under the 1998 public sector law,
any labor organization found in violation of the no-strike provision could not
run in union elections for at least five years. Therefore, the decertification of
the FMPR cleared the way for the AMPR–SPM to run unopposed in new
elections.
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Officially Unopposed in the Ballot, SEIU Still Lost the Elections
Union elections for the representation of public school teachers took place
from October 1 to 16 of 2008. The only options in the ballot were for the
AMPR–SPM, the “Yes” option, and the “No” option for no union representa-
tion. Because the FMPR could not participate in the elections, it called on
teachers to vote “No.” The FMPR was clearly outspent by the SEIU during the
elections. Although denied by the SEIU, the FMPR claims the SEIU spent as
much as $20 million in the campaign7 while FMPR spent a scrawny $65,000 to
campaign for the “No” option. However, the FMPR was not outgunned because
the FMPR mobilized thousands of rank-and-file teachers in support of the “No”
option. The “No” option won by a large margin—18,125 against 14,675 “Yes”
votes. Perhaps most impressive was the 95 percent voter participation rate that
would embarrass most local union referenda in the U.S., where union members
seldom participate.
After the elections, the FMPR declared that it had won against the “dues
suckers,” “company union,” and “labor colonialists” of the AMPR–SPM (Torres
Torres 2008). By that time, the FMPR had reorganized itself as a bona fide
association and counted with 11,000 members who voluntarily joined the
FMPR, and requested the DOE to deduct membership fees for the union
(Torres Torres 2008). These union elections and the reorganization of the
FMPR proved that the FMPR, even as a minority union, remained an impressive
social force that not even spectacular “top-down” campaigns by U.S.-based
unions and government opposition could defeat.
Oligarchic Tendencies of Organizations
Labor “imperialism” and “colonialism” are terms generally associated with
the Leninist left and related national liberation movements. Lenin developed a
concept of the “labor aristocracy,”8 which then has been extended into notions
of labor imperialism and colonialism. According to Lenin, developed nations,
which are dominant centers of capitalism (the “imperialists”), extend to under-
developed countries to control markets of raw materials and open other markets
to sell their excess manufactured goods. In this manner, imperialists “buy cheap
and sell dear.” This relationship of unequal exchange stunts the capacity of
developing countries to develop economically, tying them to dependent eco-
nomic relations with imperialist countries, while imperialist countries make
“super-profits.” Moreover, workers in the imperialist countries, believing that
their higher standard of living depends on the continued subjugation of the
colonies to their imperialist nation, collaborate in the processes of subjugation
and colonialism by supporting their national political forces, turning those
workers into a “labor aristocracy” and agents of imperialism (Lenin 1939, 13–4).
Many actions of the AFL–CIO during the Cold War, which included
orchestrating coups against left-wing governments, could fit this theory of labor
imperialism or colonialism (See Buhle 1999, 136–45). However, there is not an
241ROSADO MARZÁN: PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN
ounce of evidence that would sustain that the SEIU supports Puerto Rican
colonialism or its submission to the U.S. imperialist project. In fact, the SEIU
officially recognizes Puerto Rico’s right of self-determination and formally con-
siders the inhabitants of the U.S. “Commonwealth” as a distinct nation. In fact,
visible SEIU officers at both the international and local levels started their
activist careers in Puerto Rican socialist and national liberation organizations
such as the Cuban-inspired (and now defunct) Partido Socialista Puertorriqueño.
Moreover, we must be reminded that the SEIU did not create the AMPR–
SPM to dominate Puerto Rican unionism. The AMPR has almost a one
hundred-year-old history in Puerto Rico, and its collective bargaining arm,
SPM, voluntarily affiliated with the SEIU. The AMPR’s rivalry with the FMPR
goes back to the 1960s, much before the SEIU was even a known entity in
Puerto Rico. The SEIU could be blamed for getting involved in a street fight it
did not initiate, lured by the prospects of power and money, but not for causing
the current fight between rival teachers’ unions.
Nevertheless, there is another way in which the SEIU’s actions in Puerto
Rico can be considered “colonial,” which we should lay out in the open for
discussion. One of the giants of twentieth century social science, Joseph Schum-
peter (1991), arguing against the Leninist conception of imperialism, sustained
that imperialism was a process of institutional expansion of bureaucratic orga-
nization motivated simply by pursuit of power. In this manner, imperialism is
“objectless,” with no inherent or underlying class interest driving the institu-
tional expansion, in contrast with the Leninist view where class interests are the
locus of imperialism.
Schumpeter’s view of imperialism, when extended to the phenomenon of
organizational diffusion, shares common ground with Robert Michels’ theory of
“oligarchic tendencies of organizations” (Michels 1962). For Michels, the one-
party state structure of labor unions and the concentration of union resources on
incumbents make the organizations inherently undemocratic, eventually unin-
terested in pursuing their substantive goals and becoming increasingly involved
in maintaining and consolidating their power. Hence, a Michels–Schumpeter
driven theory of union expansion from core to peripheral areas, or from the U.S.
to Puerto Rico, would sustain that U.S. unions extend to Puerto Rico to pursue
nothing other than greater power and resources, a likely explanation given that
the 40,000-member bargaining unit of the FMPR would not only have provided
a hefty and steady stream of dues moneys to the SEIU, but also would have
helped that international union consolidate itself as the most important union in
Puerto Rico.
Conclusion
The SEIU’s setbacks in Puerto Rico, as the situation with UHW, may simply
be exceptions to the rule, blemishes in an overall landscape of progress by that
international union and, generally, U.S. unions. For one, Barack Obama, sup-
ported universally by the labor movement, won the elections and has promised
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to sign the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) when passed by Congress. The
EFCA would apply to Puerto Rico, just as the rest of the Federal labor laws, and
will help promote unionism in the island. Moreover, union membership in the
U.S. increased in 2008 by more than 428,000 members, which provides evidence
of some labor resurgence even without the EFCA (Bureau of Labor Statistics
2009). Finally, many prominent union leaders are speaking about fusing the now
divided AFL–CIO and Change to Win unions into a new federation. This is
progress.
However, as this essay goes to press, not only have there been internal
problems in the SEIU, but also leaders of one of the Change to Win unions,
UNITE HERE, are also involved in inner struggles, threatening to break the
union into its former UNITE and HERE segments, or displacing one of the
two factions from the union’s leadership (Meyerson 2009). Moreover, there is
concern in labor circles that Congress will not pass the EFCA and nothing will
get to Obama’s desk for approval. What then?
But most importantly, in the U.S., more than 1.5 million workers lost their
jobs from November of 2008 through January of 2009. In Puerto Rico, unem-
ployment figures have seldom risen above the double digits since the 1960s, and
it currently stands at about 13 percent, or about twice that of the U.S. To make
matters much worse in an economy that has already lost thousands of private
sector jobs, on March 3, 2009, the Governor of Puerto Rico, Luis Fortuño,
announced that the government would have to axe about 30,000 employees—
about 10 percent of the total number of government employees—in order to
balance the budget and stop credit agencies from degrading Puerto Rico’s
bonds to “junk” status. In a country of roughly four million inhabitants, where
only about 1.3 million are in the economically active population, 30,000 job cuts
blow a large hole on an already tattered economic structure. Moreover, with 1
percent—yes, “one percent”—union density in manufacturing and commerce,
and 3 percent in the services sector—a category that includes public sector
employees (Negociado de Estadísticas del Trabajo 2005)—we can confidently
say that private sector unions are essentially nonexistent in Puerto Rico.
Employers won that fight.
With such a negative organizational landscape in Puerto Rico, a less than
desirable one in the U.S., and with a deep economic crisis in our throes,
infighting by the union officialdom seems almost comical. Of course, the
problem is that none of these is really funny, at least as far as workers are
concerned. Notwithstanding the fact that most workers desire to be in a union
and have health care, pension benefits, and “for cause” termination as corner-
stones of their employment, most workers simply do not engage in collective
workplace activism. Hope, if anywhere, seems to be placed on individual actions,
the government, or God.
This can change, but it will require a multipronged strategy that combines
not only top-down tactics, such as pushing for the EFCA and political lobbying,
but also massive efforts to reignite bottom-up mobilization to levels significantly
much grander than ever attempted in recent labor history. If banks need a
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multitrillion dollar bailout to recover from their crisis, unions need millions of
new worker activists to be involved in the lives of their organizations to make
them more relevant and influential players in our political economy. For these
ends, unions have to provide workers with real possibilities to attain authorita-
tive positions in their organizations and put significant resources at their disposal
to combat employers at the level of production and in their communities. In the
U.S., this has to mean stopping internal fights, focusing energies both on the
workplace, local and state levels and on Washington, but not merely through
lobbying. One key area where organizing will matter will be among the unem-
ployed, who already reach the millions and could serve as a powerful group of
organized worker-citizens to stir U.S. politics leftward, if that energy is orga-
nized and channeled appropriately.
In Puerto Rico, U.S.-based solidarity has to mean that unions need to stop
the practice of putting millions of dollars of their members’ dues into union
election campaigns that resemble old-fashioned “raids” and channel resources
into activities that truly organize and unite the working class. U.S. union
members’ dues could be spent on organizing private sector workers, itself the
most important item that labor should have in its agenda in Puerto Rico, as well
as the unemployed. Resources can also be committed to build horizontal alli-
ances with existing unions and other sectors of civil society, such as the amalgam
of community groups challenging everything from mass layoffs to the acts and
corruption of unscrupulous construction companies that degrade the Caribbean
island’s environment. Moreover, rather than challenging existing unions with
clean records and high levels of prestige, such as the FMPR, and getting involved
in their street fights, U.S. unions in Puerto Rico should be serving as third party
mediators of such conflicts, functioning as agents of unity. With the economic
crisis and massive layoffs affecting so many working families in Puerto Rico,
anything short of the most principled solidarity by U.S. unions will be seen by
many in the progressive community as tantamount to betrayal.
U.S.-based unions could also channel resources to reinforce the island’s
autochthonous and long-standing practice of minority unionism, which led to
the organization of the public sector in the 1960s and which remains alive today
even after the Puerto Rican government and U.S.-based unions tried to totally
replace it with exclusive representation unionism. Even in the National Labor
Relations Act’s context, recognition and certification of minority unions have
been proposed as a way to bring back industrial democracy to the American
workplace (Morris 2005). In Puerto Rico, a fortified version of minority union-
ism in the traditional agencies of the public sector, already a labor institution,
could aim for workers’ right to bargain with their employers once they organize
themselves into a bona fide association, even without majority support. Given
that exclusive representation in the public sector has almost invariably led to
raiding and has not increased labor union density at all, unions in Puerto Rico
should even tactically consider abandoning exclusive representation for public
sector employees in the traditional government agencies. Pressuring the gov-
ernment to recognize and bargain with minority unions will not only help
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increase union density, and strengthen union and industrial democracy, but
could also dampen the raids between unions. To close the representation gap
that will result from member-only agreements, the government could extend the
wages and terms and conditions of employment of union members to nonunion
employees, as it occurs in France, Germany and other international jurisdictions.
Strengthening minority unionism is a policy item that all unions in Puerto
Rico, both U.S.-based and independent, would benefit from. However, no one,
on either side of the fence, has ever discussed or proposed it as a legislative
initiative in Puerto Rico. Is this thinking too much outside the box? But is this
not precisely what we need to be doing today in light of labor’s organizational
crisis and the economic hecatomb that lies before us?
It is almost ironic that in spite of the millions of dollars that unions commit to
“research” and to draw up complex union strategies that include litigation, having
a say in capital investment bodies and corporate boards, perhaps the union action
that most caught the attention of the American public in recent years was this
winter’s improvised takeover of the Republic Windows factory of Chicago by its
workers after the factory announced it would shut down without paying severance
pay or providing sixty-day notice of the plant’s closing to the workers. The
workers’ direct action put not only the manufacturer on the spotlight, but also
Bank of America, which, even though received billions of public bailout funds,
would not provide a relatively small credit line to the manufacturer to pay workers
the moneys it owed to them. These workers’ actions eventually led them to obtain
their severance pay and even attracted the attention of a “green” manufacturing
company in California, which is now interested in buying the Republic Windows
factory to reopen it and reemploy the workers (Streit 2009). These actions by
flesh-and-blood workers are the kinds of events that put positive, national and
international attention on the labor movement in a way that inspires others to take
workplace activism as an important call for their own benefit and the public good.
This is the real “stuff” of unions.
Especially in light of the global crisis and tragic internal strife faced by
unions, perhaps it is time to pause and refocus our energies. In these times, our
goals should be to act in the most principled of ways, open labor union structures
to all workers, and build and provide the required organizational resources so
that the working class can successfully stir history in a direction that strengthens
it. This is what solidarity is all about.
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Notes
1. The Governor of Puerto Rico, Anibal Acevedo Vilá, at the time also President of the Popular Democratic
Party (known as the “PPD,” its acronym in Spanish) and Dennis Rivera, an influential leader of the SEIU,
directly involved in the SEIU’s bid to represent Puerto Rican teachers, were known to be in friendly
relations (González 2008). Meanwhile, the FMPR alleged that the government of Puerto Rico was stalling
in the collective bargaining negotiations with the union, to the point of leaving all 40,000 teachers without
a contract for three years.
2. This idea is generally voiced by some nationalists in public debates, among them independent union leader
Luis Pedraza Leduc (Rosado Marzán 2005, 109).
3. Reasons for the FLT and the Socialist Party’s turn to the right were complicated. For a historical analysis,
see Galvin (1979, chapter 6).
4. The PPD promoted the current “Commonwealth” status of Puerto Rico, a territorial arrangement with the
U.S. which, although still made Puerto Rico subject to the U.S. territorial clause and Congress’ plenary
powers, provided some self-rule for Puerto Rico backed by fiscal autonomy for the island and Federal tax
breaks to promote U.S. investment.
5. “Pro-statehood” in Puerto Rico refers to the political tendency that favors Puerto Rico’s annexation to the
U.S. as the fifty-first state of the union.
6. According to the FMPR’s leadership, the strike was democratically debated at every public school. It was
finally voted in favor by a members’ assembly. Nevertheless, the leadership’s decision to implement the
strike vote in February of 2008 was criticized by labor union rivals, such as the SEIU’s leaders in Puerto
Rico, Roberto Pagán and Aida Díaz, as well as labor union figures friendly to the FMPR, such as labor
lawyer Alejandro Torres Rivera. According to Torres Rivera, there was no tactical need to call for a strike
at a moment when the DOE was acting defensively and making concessions (Torres Rivera 2009). The
SEIU leadership harped on the FMPR’s likely ill-conceived decision to implement the strike vote as
evidence that the leadership was not serious about representing teachers but, rather, was motivated by
hidden political agendas. Nevertheless, even this point did not persuade enough teachers to provide the
SEIU to give the U.S.-based union exclusive representation rights over Puerto Rican teachers.
7. The SEIU local leadership in Puerto Rico denies that the international union spent $20 million in the
campaign, but neither could it confirm a different number. The SEIU campaign did count with expensive
prime-time television commercials, colored full-page newspaper advertisements, and huge billboard signs
in Puerto Rico’s main highways, among other propaganda.
8. However, as Post (2006) has argued, the concept of a labor aristocracy dates back at least to Fredrick Engels
in his letters to Karl Marx.
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